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RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND  THE 
PROBLEM OF PERFECTION 
BY DAVID G.  PEARCE' 
This  paper  explores  the  fundamental  problem  of  what  can  be  inferred  about  the 
outcome  of  a  noncooperative  game,  from  the  rationality of  the  players  and  from  the 
information they possess. The  answer is summarized in a  solution  concept  called  ratio- 
nalizability.  Strategy  profiles  that  are  rationalizable  are  not  always  Nash  equilibria; 
conversely, the information in an extensive form game often allows certain "unreasonable" 
Nash  equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles. A stronger form of 
rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely "rational" but also 
"cautious." 
1. INTRODUCTION 
"WHAT  CONSTITUTES RATIONAL BEHAVIOR in  a  noncooperative  strategic situa- 
tion?" This  paper  explores  the  issue  in  the  context  of  a  wide  class  of  finite 
noncooperative  games in  extensive form. The  traditional answer relies heavily 
upon  the  idea  of  Nash  equilibrium (Nash  [17]). The  position  developed  here, 
however, is that as a criterion for judging a profile of  strategies to be "reason- 
able" choices  for players in  a game,  the Nash  equilibrium property is neither 
necessary nor sufficient. Some Nash  equilibria are intuitively unreasonable, and 
not all reasonable strategy profiles are Nash equilibria. 
The fact that a Nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well-known: 
the equilibrium may be "imperfect." Introduced into the literature by Selten [20], 
the  idea  of  imperfect equilibria has  prompted game  theorists to  search for  a 
narrower definition of  equilibrium. While this research, some of  which will be 
discussed here, has been extremely instructive, it remains inconclusive. Theorists 
often agree about what should happen in particular games, but to capture this 
intuition in  a  general solution concept  has proved to  be  very difficult. If  this 
paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction. 
The other side of the coin has received less scrutiny. Can all non-Nash profiles 
really be excluded on logical grounds? I believe not. The standard justifications 
for  considering only  Nash  profiles are circular in  nature, or make  gratuitous 
assumptions about players' decision criteria or beliefs. The following discussion 
of  these  points  is  extremely  brief,  due  to  space  constraints;  more  detailed 
arguments may be found in Pearce [18]. 
I am concerned here with situations in which players are unable to communi- 
1  I  am very grateful to Bob Anderson and Hugo Sonnenschein for their invaluable assistance. Not 
everyone who commented on this work can be mentioned here, but I would particularly like to thank 
Mark Bagnoli, Doug Bernheim, Bentley MacLeod, John C. Harsanyi, Vijay Krishna, Roger Myerson, 
Robert  Wilson,  and  the  anonymous  referees  for  their  helpful  suggestions.  Finally,  I  wish  to 
acknowledge  a  major  intellectual  debt  that  I  owe  my  colleague,  Dilip  Abreu.  Our  countless 
discussions on game theory have played a central role in shaping my ideas about strategic behavior. 
Of course, only I can be held responsible for the statements made herein. 
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cate  with  one  another before  or  during the  game.  The  most  sweeping  (and, 
perhaps, historically  the  most  frequently invoked)  case  for  Nash  equilibrium 
theory  in  such  circumstances asserts that  a  player's strategy must  be  a  best 
response to those selected by other players, because he can deduce what those 
strategies are. Player i  can  figure out j's  strategic choice  by  merely imagining 
himself in j's  position. But this takes for granted that there is a unique rational 
choice forj  to make; this uniqueness is not derived from fundamental rationality 
postulates, but is simply assumed. Furthermore, any  argument suggesting that 
player rationality, combined with the structural characteristics of a game, inevita- 
bly renders all but one outcome "impossible," leads to conclusions that contra- 
dict widely accepted notions of "perfection" (Pearce [19]). Once one admits the 
possibility that a player may have several strategies that he could reasonably use, 
expectations may be mismatched. Player i's strategy will then be a best response 
to  his  (possibly  incorrect)  conjecture about  others'  strategies, not  the  actual 
strategies employed. 
A  less  ambitious  defense  of  Nash  equilibrium is  that  although  equilibrium 
might not be attained in a one-shot game, players will eventually arrive at some 
Nash profile if the game is repeated indefinitely. Among the many objections to 
this claim, the most conclusive  is that there may well be  supergame equilibria 
involving phenomena (implicit collusion, maintenance of reputation, and so on) 
that are incompatible with single-period maximizing behavior. It is misleading, 
then,  to  study  a  repeated  game  by  investigating  the  Nash  equilibria of  the 
one-shot  game.  But  a  more  persuasive  story  can  be  told  in  which  different 
players are involved at each iteration of the game. Each player is concerned only 
with  one-period  payoffs,  but  can  look  to  the  history  of  play  for  guidance 
regarding the likely choices of his opponents. While one cannot prove that each 
generation of players will follow a pattern set by previous participants, such an 
outcome  seems quite plausible. But we are interested in analyzing many  situa- 
tions for which no precedents exist (such as nuclear wars between superpowers) 
or in which continual changes in relevant variables (technological breakthroughs, 
new  legislation,  and  so  on)  preclude  prediction  based  on  tradition.  It  then 
becomes  crucial to  understand precisely what are the implications  of  players' 
information and rationality. 
Most of this paper is devoted to the development and evaluation of a solution 
concept  called  "rationalizability."2 It  is  offered  as  an  answer to  my  opening 
question:  "What  constitutes  rational  behavior  in  a  noncooperative  strategic 
situation?" No  attempt is made to single out a unique strategy profile for each 
game; instead, a profile is rationalizable if each player has selected any strategy 
2Rationalizability in normal form games was developed independently by Doug Bernheim [2]. The 
expression "ex ante equilibrium" which I used in earlier work [18] has been adandoned here in favor 
of Bernheim's descriptive term "rationalizability," in order to unify the terminology in the literature. 
Our papers are complementary in many respects, his analyzing more general games in normal form 
and comparing Nash  equilibrium to rationalizability, and mine spending more time than his on the 
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that is "reasonable" in a sense to be made precise. A  single player might have 
many such strategies. 
While  allowing for more flexibility than the Nash  solution concept  permits, 
one wishes to eliminate the problem of imperfection. This is complicated by the 
fact  that  there  are  actually  two  types  of  behavior  that  have  been  labelled 
"imperfect" in  the  literature. The  first involves  "implausible behavior  at  un- 
reached  information  sets"  and  arises  only  in  games  having  some  sequential 
nature. The  second  is  intimately  related  to  the  first, but  can  occur  even  in 
perfectly simultaneous games. It concerns the taking of risks that seem "likely" to 
be costly, when there are no offsetting advantages for a player to consider. The 
first type  of  imperfection can  be  ruled out  on  the  basis  of  rather innocuous 
rationality  postulates.  Elimination  of  the  second  type,  however,  requires an 
additional  assumption,  amounting  to  the  assertion  that  players  will  exercise 
prudence  when  it  is  costless  to  do  so.  Accordingly,  I  define  two  solution 
concepts. The first, rationalizability, relies upon little more than logical deduc- 
tion, and  ignores the second  type of  imperfect behavior. A  narrower solution 
concept, which I call cautious rationalizability, makes the additional assumption 
needed to eliminate imperfections of the second type. 
For expositional purposes the early sections of the paper deal only with normal 
form representations of  games. Because I believe  that the additional structure 
provided by  the extensive form is often  important in determining how players 
will  act,  I  interpret a  normal form game  as  a  convenient  representation of  a 
perfectly simultaneous game, in which no one can observe any move of any other 
player before moving himself. Such games can be analyzed without the encum- 
brance of the extensive form structure. The analysis of Sections 2 and 3 should 
be  understood as  an  investigation of  a  special class  of  extensive form games. 
Indeed,  the general solution  concepts  ultimately proposed in Sections 4 and  5 
reduce to those of Sections 2 and 3 for nonstochastic games in which everyone 
moves  simultaneously. Many  of  the  central themes of  the paper come  across 
more clearly in these special games. 
2.  RATIONALIZABILITY  IN NORMAL  FORM GAMES 
The purpose of this section is to develop a solution concept for finite normal 
form games, based on three assumptions: 
ASSUMPTION  (Al):  When a player lacks an objective probability distribution 
over another player's choice of strategy, he forms a subjective prior that does not 
contradict any of the information at his disposal. 
ASSUMPTION  (A2):  Each player maximizes his expected utility relative to his 
subjective priors regarding the strategic choices of others. 
ASSUMPTION  (A3):  The  structure of  the  game  (including  all  participants' 1032  DAVID G. PEARCE 
strategies and payoffs, and the fact that each player satisfies Assumptions (A1) 
and  (A2))  is  common  knowledge  (see  Aumann  [1]). Roughly  speaking,  some 
information 0 is common knowledge if for any players i, j,...  ,  k, the statement 
"i knows thatj  knows that ...  that k knows 9" is true. 
An N-person noncooperative normal form game 
G = (S,  ...,  SN;  Ul...  UN) 
is completely characterized by the finite nonempty sets Si of pure strategies, and 
real-valued utility functions  Ui  having  domain  IINjIjS'.  The  set M'  of  mixed 
strategies for player i is a simplex in Euclidean space; Ui is extended to frlr  =Mr 
by an expected utility calculation. Let M =  (M,  ...  .,  MN). 
A strategy a G M' is strongly dominated  if 3y  G M' such that V(m', ... .,  mN) 
i  N  lMr, 
>  u  ml  .  ,_  mi-  1, n  i  N) 
A strategy b G M'  is a best response for i to a profile (ml,  ...  ,  mN) if Vd  G Ml, 
U  1m,.  i-  1  b  i+  l  N) 
U'(  Ui, . . . , m  i  AM  d,  mi+l  m 
If b G B'  c  M'  and instead the above weak inequality holds for every d G Bi, 
then  b is a best response  in B' to (ml,  . ..  , mN). Throughout  the paper  A denotes 
the convex  hull  of a set A. If A c  M',  a conjecture  over A can be regarded  (for 
the purposes of expected utility calculations) as an element of A (see Lemma  1 
and Lemma 2 of Appendix A). 
I  now  define  functions  R'  which,  when  applied  to  the  vector  M  of  mixed 
strategy sets, yield the sets of "rationalizable" strategies for each player. Immedi- 
ately following this definition is a discussion of its motivation. 
DEFINITION  1: For arbitrary sets H'  c  M',  i =  1, . . . ,  N,  let H'(O)  =  H',  and 
for each i  define H'(t)  inductively for t =  1,2,  .  .  .  by H'(t)  =  {a  G H'(t  -  1): 
37y  I1N  ,Hr(t  -1)  such that a is a best response in H'(t  -  1) to y}. 
Define 
00 
R'(H  l  HN  )  n= flH'(t). 
t= 1 
Thus the operation R'  is an iterative procedure; at each  stage, a strategy is 
retained only if it is a best response to some conjecture over strategies (for other 
players) that have not been  removed at an earlier stage. By Assumptions (Al) RATIONALIZABLE  STRATEGIC  BEHAVIOR  1033 
and (A2)  each player chooses  a best response to  some  strategy (/B1,...  .,  AN) 
rE  fl=  iMr;  in  the notation  of  Definition  1, i's strategic choice  lies  in MI(l). 
Since this is an implication of Assumptions (Al)  and (A2), which by (A3) are 
common knowledge, each player knows this information, and restricts his conjec- 
ture to  elements  of  JIN  l1Mr(l).  Thus  a  best  response of  any  playerj  to  his 
conjecture, is an element of M'(2).  Again this is common knowledge, and t-fold 
iteration of this argument, for any t, establishes that strategic choices lie within 
the sets M l(t),  . . . , M"N(t).  This being true for all t, players restrict themselves to 
the sets R l(M),  . . .,  RN(M). 
Can we exclude any other strategies on the basis of Assumptions (Al),  (A2), 
and (A3)? Proposition  1 below makes it evident that the vector (R l(M),  . . .. 
RN(M))  has the best response property: 
DEFINITION  2:  For  sets A  c  M'  i1,  .. .,  N,  (A  ....  ,A N)  has  the  best 
response property if  Vi,  a E A  implies  3y  E-=  r  =Ar  such  that  a  is  a  best 
response to y. 
This means that if player i chooses a, he can "justify"  his choice by explaining 
that  a  is  a  best  response  to  some  (-y' ...,  yN)  E  IIN  1Rr(M).  Moreover, i's 
guess about what any other playerj  is doing is also reasonable, in the sense that 
yi  can be expressed as a convex combination of strategies in Ri(M),  which are 
themselves best responses to conjectures that ]  might make about other players' 
strategies. The latter conjectures are in turn "justified"  by the existence of further 
strategy profiles in JINIZ  R  r(M),  and so on. Thus, for any strategy a e  R'(M), 
there  is  an  infinite  succession  of  conjectures,  each  of  them  consistent  with 
Assumptions (Al),  (A2), and (A3), "rationalizing" the choice of a. This motivates 
the formal definition of the solution concept. 
DEFINITION  3:  Given a finite game G =  (S l, ...  ,  SN;  U,  ...,  UN)  with the 
vector M of associated mixed strategy sets, the set of rationalizable  strategies for 
player i is R'(M).  A profile (a',  . . .,  a N)  is rationalizable if a'  c  R'(M)  Vi. 
In order to  state the main results of  this section,  an additional definition is 
necessary. 
DEFINITION  4:  A c  M'  has  the pure strategy property if  a C  A  implies  that 
every pure strategy given positive weight by a is also in A. 
PROPOSITION  1: If H'  C M'  and H'  is closed, nonempty,  and satisfies the pure 
strategy  property,  i =  , ...  , N, then (a) H'(t)  is closed, nonempty,  and satisfies the 
pure  strategy property  Vi,  and  t =  1,  2,  . ..  ; (b) for  some  integer  k, H'(t)  =  H'(k) 
for all t >  k, i =  1, . . .,  N. 
PROOF:  Proposition 1 is a special case of Proposition 4, proved in Section 4. It 
is  clear  from  (b)  that  (R '(M),  . . . , R N(M))  has  the  best  response  property. 1034  DAVID  G. PEARCE 
COROLLARY:  For each player  i,  the set  of  rationalizable strategies R'(M)  is 
nonempty,  and in fact  contains at least one pure strategy. 
PROOF:  Set  (H',  ...  ,  HN)  =  (Ml,  . ..  , MN)  in  Proposition  1. 
The  need  for players to  randomize in  many  Nash  equilibria has  long  been 
considered  somewhat  puzzling  (see,  for  example,  the  discussion  in  Luce  and 
Raiffa [14, pp. 74-76].  The incentive for randomization seems to be the need to 
"evade" one's opponents. But in the present context, opponents are not always 
able  to  figure out  a player's strategic choice;  such  a  player can  hide  without 
randomizing, camouflaged by the uncertainty of the other players. 
The following definition and proposition provide an illuminating characteriza- 
tion of the rationalizable sets, without recourse to any iterative procedure. 
DEFINITION  5:  For  each  i,  define 
E' =  {x  G M':  3X%, ...  ,  XN  with  the best  response  property, 
and x G xi)  X 
PROPOSITION  2:  E'=  R'(M)  Vi. 
PROOF: Since  (R l(M),  ...  ,  RN (M))  satisfies  the  best  response  property, 
R'(M)  Ci  E'  Vi,  by  definition.  To  establish  the  converse,  note  first  that 
(E,...  , EN)  has  the  best  response  property. a G E'  implies  X1,...  ,XN 
such that a G X' and a is a best response to some y G jir=  I  Xr. But y G fl  r= IE 
since  Xr  C  Er  Vr.  Thus  E l,  . ..  , EN  have  the  best  response  property,  which 
implies E'  C  M'(1)  Vi (see Definition  1). An inductive argument completes the 
proof: assume that for some t, E'  C  MI(t)  Vi. Then a G E'  implies a  is a best 
response to some y G HirN  Mr(t),  and hence a G M'(t  +  1). Thus for all t and i, 
E'  C  M'(t),  therefore E'  C R'(M)  Vi. 
COROLLARY:  If  (n,  ...  n N)  is a Nash  equilibrium,  (n1,  . ..  ,  n N)  is rationaliz- 
able. 
PROOF: ({n'},  ..  .  {nN})  has  the  best  response  property,  so  n'  G E' 
-  R'(M)  Vi. 
Since  a  Nash  equilibrium  always  exists  for  finite  games  (Nash  [17]),  this 
furnishes an alternative proof that the rationalizable sets are nonempty. 
Bernheim's definition of a rationalizable strategy makes explicit use of "belief 
systems." Apart from the fact that his definition applies to a more general class 
of  strategy spaces,  it  is  equivalent  to  Definitions  3  and  5  above;  this  is  the 
content of his Proposition 3.2 (Bernheim [2]). RATIONALIZABLE  STRATEGIC  BEHAVIOR  1035 
In 2-person games, a strategy is strongly dominated if and only if there is no 
conjecture to which the strategy is a best response (see Appendix B, Lemma 3). 
Hence for 2-person games, rationalizable strategies are those remaining after the 
iterative deletion of strongly dominated strategies.3  This does not hold for N > 3, 
where the rationalizable sets may be strictly smaller than (but always contained 
in) those resulting from the iterative removal of dominated strategies; an example 
of this strict containment is given by Pearce [18, p. 17]. Proofs of the equivalence 
of  the two procedures for N = 2  could  easily be  extended  to  arbitrary N  if  a 
player's opponents could coordinate their randomized strategic actions. 
The  matrix game  G,  below  provides a  simple example  in  which  non-Nash 
profiles are rationalizable. The reader can easily verify that (a,;  f3I) is a Nash 
equilibrium that Pareto dominates all other Nash  equilibria of  GI. Some game 
theorists, then, would  single out  (a,;  f,3) as  the solution  of  GI. Opposition is 
bound to come from others who would insist that in the face of  l's indifference 
between a,  and a2  (regardless of 2's strategic choice), 2 should consider it equally 
likely (according to  the principle of  insufficient reason) that a,  and  a2  will be 
played. 2 would then choose I2,  which is not his strategy in the Pareto dominant 
equilibrium. In a case such as this where two attractive rules of thumb conflict 
with one another, should we be astonished if  1 decides to play a1, for example, 
while 2 plays /82? The profile is clearly rationalizable (as is every profile in G,), 
but not a Nash equilibrium. 
The principal drawback of rationalizability is clear: it typically does not allow 
a  specific  prediction  to  be  made  about  strategic choice.  (For  example,  in  the 
game "matching pennies," all  strategies are rationalizable.) But this indetermi- 
nacy  is  an  accurate reflection of  the  difficult  situation  faced  by  players in  a 
game.  The  rules of  a  game  and  its  numerical data  are  seldom  sufficient  for 
logical deduction alone to single out a unique choice of strategy for each player. 
To  do  so one  requires either richer information (such as institutional detail or 
perhaps historical precedent for a certain type of  behavior) or bolder assump- 
tions about how players choose strategies. Putting further restrictions on strategic 
choice is a complex and treacherous task. But one's intuition frequently points to 
patterns of behavior that cannot be isolated on the grounds of consistency alone. 
Formalizing this intuition in specific solution concepts would seem to be a matter 
of high priority; I interpret papers such as Harsanyi [11] to be in this spirit. 
2 
/ 2 
al  (0,5)  (-1,3) 
12  (0,0)  (-1,3) 
3Such  procedures have long been a part of the game-theoretic literature; see for example Gale [8], 
Farquharson [61, and Luce and Raiffa [14], as well as the more recent work by Moulin [151. 1036  DAVID  G. PEARCE 
3.  CAUTIOUS  RATIONALIZABILITY  IN THE NORMAL  FORM 
The  notion  of  an imperfect equilibrium was  originally conceived  (see  Selten 
[20]), and  is  still most  commonly  perceived,  as  a  problem  arising because  of 
"implausible behavior at unreached information sets." This is obviously applica- 
ble  only  to  extensive  form  games,  which  are treated in  later sections.  But  a 
related phenomenon  appears in  normal  form  games,  and  has  received  some 
attention.  In  particular  the  paper  by  Myerson  [16]  on  perfect  and  proper 
equilibria concerns exactly this issue. 
Myerson's opening example is perhaps the simplest illustration of the problem 
at hand. G2  has two Nash equilibria. In the first, 1 and 2 select the pure strategies 
a,  and .8  respectively. In the second, they choose  a2  and  82  respectively. The 
latter equilibrium is, as Myerson indicates, counterintuitive: "it would be unrea- 
sonable to predict (a2,  12)  as the outcome of the game. If player 1 thought that 
there was  any chance  of  player 2  using /3I, then  1 would  certainly prefer a," 
(Myerson  [16,  page  74]).  It  is  clear  that  1 is  taking  an  unnecessary  risk by 
choosing a2. He has nothing to gain by doing so, and possibly something to lose. 
The same applies to player 2, who would be foolish to choose 82. 
Explanations  of  why  a  certain equilibrium is  to  be  considered  "imperfect" 
usually involve stories about players making mistakes with small positive proba- 
bilities. This is a departure from tradition in the theory of games, and one senses 
a certain reluctance in Selten's remarks: "There cannot be  any mistakes if the 
players  are  absolutely  rational.  Nevertheless,  a  satisfactory  interpretation of 
equilibrium points  in  extensive  games  seems  to  require that the  possibility  of 
mistakes is not  completely excluded. This can be  achieved by  a point  of  view 
which looks at complete rationality as a limiting case of incomplete rationality" 
(Selten [21, Section 7]). The same reasoning is employed in normal form games, 
and  Myerson  concludes  his  commentary  on  the  game  G2 by  saying  that 
" . . . there is always a small chance that any strategy might be chosen, if only by 
mistake. So in our example, a,  and .8  must always get at least an infinitesimal 
probability weight, which will eliminate (a2, 12)  from the class of perfect (and 
proper) equilibria" (Myerson [16, p. 74]). 
In my opinion the "slight mistakes" story does not do justice to our intuition 
about how players make their decisions. In game G2, if 1 prefers a , to a2,  it is not 
because he believes that 2 might "make a mistake" and play fl.  On the contrary, 
AI would be an eminently reasonable choice for 2 (regardless of  l's  choice).  l's 
reluctance to choose a2 reflects l's belief that 2 is likely to choose .B deliberately, 
not as a result of incomplete rationality. Similarly, 2 is likely to use f,3  because he 
expects that 1 will probably select a1; no errors enter the picture. I will argue that 
a1  (1,1)  (0,0) 
1  G2 
a2  (0 ,0)  (0,0) RATIONALIZABLE  STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR  1037 
there  is  no  need  to  base  an  analysis  of  imperfect  behavior  on  incomplete 
rationality; an alternative is available which conforms more closely to intuition. 
First, an extremely brief sketch of the solution concepts proposed by Selten and 
Myerson is given. This is not meant to be a substitute for reading the original 
definitions. 
In a game G =  (S,  ..  .,  sN;  Ul,...,  UN),  a totally mixed strategy for player 
i is a mixed strategy giving positive weight to each pure strategy in Si.  For any 
small  positive  number E, an  e-equilibrium of  G is  a  profile  of  totally  mixed 
strategies (t',  . . . , tN)  such that for each i, player i gives weight greater than e to 
a  given  element  s  of  Si  only  if  s  is  a  best  response  to  (t',  . . . , tN).  If 
(z,  .  ..  ,  zN)  is  the limit of  e-equilibria as E-*O, (zI,  .  ..  ,  ZN)  iS  said to  be  a 
perfect  equilibrium  of  G.  (Each  component  of  (t,  . . . , tN)  is  an  element  of 
Euclidean space; convergence is with respect to the usual Euclidean metric.) This 
is Myerson's formulation (Myerson [16]) of what is often called "trembling hand 
perfect equilibrium," originally defined by Selten [21] on the extensive form. 
Roughly speaking, an e-proper  equilibrium  is a "combination of totally mixed 
strategies  in  which  every  player  is  giving  his  better  responses  much  more 
probability weight than his worse responses (by a factor  1/e),  whether or not 
those  'better'  responses  are  'best'  . .  .  . We  now  define  a proper  equilibrium  to  be 
any limit of E-proper  equilibria" (Myerson [16, p. 78]). 
Requiring, as proper equilibrium does, that when contemplating an opponent's 
"trembles," a  player  should  give  much  higher weight  to  relatively innocuous 
mistakes than to those which would cause the opponent serious damage, suggests 
that one  is interested in  "sensible trembles." In  other words, the idea  behind 
proper equilibrium seems  to  be  that  a  player  should  be  open-minded  about 
various reasonable alternative strategies his  opponents  might use;  the  random 
component attributed to an opponent's action must not be arbitrary. While it is 
important to insist that doubts entertained by a player regarding his opponents' 
strategies should be  concentrated upon reasonable possibilities, proper equilib- 
rium attempts to  enforce this without reference to  any  theory specifying what 
possibilities are realistic. This explains the failure of proper equilibrium to rule 
out unreasonable choices in many games. One well-known example is presented 
later in this section. 
I  believe  that  the  analysis of  Section  2  provides the kind of  theory that is 
required to determine what "reasonable doubts" players can rationally entertain 
regarding the choices  of  their opponents.  For each game, rationalizability dis- 
tinguishes those strategies that players could employ without violating the impli- 
cations  of  the  common  knowledge  they possess,  from those  that  are patently 
unreasonable. If the condition that players do not take unnecessary risks is to be 
imposed by  requiring that their conjectures give positive weight to  all "likely" 
alternatives, those strategies that are not rationalizable should still be given zero 
weight. This constraint can be imposed by modifying the iterative procedure of 
the previous section, using the idea of a "cautious response." 
DEFINITION  6:  Let A'  c  M'  and Xi  c  Mi, j  =  1, . . .,  N. A strategy c C A'  is 1038  DAVID  G. PEARCE 
a cautious response  in A' to (X,  ...  .,  XN)  if 3(y  ......  E  GfN  xr  such that 
(i)  y  gives  positive  weight  to  each  pure strategy in  Xk,  Vk;  (ii)  c  is  a  best 
response in A'  to (71,  . . .,  N). 
DEFINITION  7:  Given  the  sets  R l(M),  ...  ,  R N(M)  of  rationalizable  strategies, 
for each i let 
C'(1)  =  {G E  R'(M):  a is a cautious response in R'(M) 
to (R l(M),  . . .,  RN(M))}. 
For t >  1, define C'(t)  recursively for each i by 
C (t)  =  {G E  R'(C(t  -  1)):  a is a cautious  response  in R'(C(t  -  1)) 
to (R I(C(t  -1))5  . ..,  R N(C(t  -1)))}, 
where C(t -  1) =  (C(t  -  1), .  .  .,  CN(t  -1)),  and the functions R' are those of 
Definition  1, Section 2. For each i, 
00 
Qi  nCi(t) 
t=  1 
is  the  set  of  cautiously rationalizable strategies  for  player  i.  A  profile  (al, 
...  , a  is  cautiously rationalizable if a  E  Q'  Vi.  At  each "round," strategies 
that  are not  best  responses are eliminated  first, and  then  those  that  are not 
cautious responses are removed. 
PROPOSITION  3:  For  some  integer  k, 
C'(t)  =  C'(k)  Vt >  k,  Vi. 
Moreover, the set  Q' of cautiously rationalizable strategies is nonempty,  closed, 
and satisfies the pure strategy  property Vi. 
The proof of Proposition 3 is omitted, since it is similar to those of  Proposi- 
tions  1  and  4.  Lemma  4  of  Appendix  B  relates  the  operation  C  to  weak 
dominance. 
The solution concept performs as desired on Myerson's example G2, and the 
reader can easily verify that cautious rationalizability is equally appropriate when 
applied to  another example (not  given here) constructed in  Myerson  [16], for 
which proper equilibrium also does well. But consider G3, the normal form of a 
well-known extensive form game (to be called F2) that is discussed in the next 
section. Notice  that (a,,  f82) iS one of the Nash equilibrium profiles of this game; 
in fact, one  can  show (ax1,  f82) is both  a trembling hand perfect, and a proper 
equilibrium. Why would 2 ever select /82? /82 is preferable to .8  only if  1 gives 
considerable weight to a3. But 2 knows that a3 is strongly dominated for 1 by a I, 
and will never be played. Thus, there is no  risk to playing  8,,  and a superior RATIONALIZABLE  STRATEGIC  BEHAVIOR  1039 
2  2 
P1  I 2  P  2 
a,  (1,1)  (1,1)  a1  (10,10)  (10,0) 
1  a2  (2,-1)  (-10,-2)  G3  a2  (10,10)  (0,0) 
a3  (0,-2)  (0,-1) 
return for playing P, rather than f82 if a2  is played. If 2 were a "cautious" player, 
it  would  be  ridiculous for  him  to  play  f82;  knowing  this,  1 plays  a2.  In  the 
notation developed above, C '(I)  contains all strategies giving zero weight to a33, 
while C2(1)  =  { PI  }.  Then  R 1(C(1))  =  {f2},  and  R 2(C(1))  =  { PI }.  No  further 
reduction can take place;  the unique cautiously rationalizable profile coincides 
with the only reasonable Nash equilibrium of G3, namely (a2; P31) 
On the other hand, cautious rationalizability was formulated with games such 
as G4 in mind, where it singles out P, for 2, but respects l's  legitimate indiffer- 
ence between al  and a2  (given that 2's rationality is common knowledge, 1 knows 
that f2  will not be played). 
Bernheim's "perfect rationalizability" [2] is the natural extension of the "trem- 
bling hand" idea from Nash  equilibrium to rationalizability. It is not equivalent 
to  cautious  rationalizability, which  is  motivated  quite  differently.  In  G3, for 
example, f82 is perfectly, but not cautiously, rationalizable. Conversely, in G4, a2 
is cautiously, but not perfectly, rationalizable. 
4.  RATIONALIZABILITY IN THE EXTENSIVE FORM 
This  section  generalizes  the  analysis  of  Section  2  to  games  having  some 
sequential nature. In this context it is possible to study the best-known type of 
imperfect  behavior,  namely  unreasonable  behavior  at  unreached  information 
sets. The problem is attacked using the idea of consistent conjectures, without the 
additional assumptions needed to ensure cautious behavior. Those assumptions 
are invoked in Section 5, because what I have called imperfections of the second 
type may still arise in the extensive form. 
A  complete  formal  description  of  an  extensive  form  game  would  be  too 
lengthy to be appropriate here. Some knowledge of  extensive form games and 
their normal forms is taken for granted, but a number of initial definitions are 
unavoidable. The reader who requires precise definitions of the terms used here 
should consult Selten [21]. 
I  restrict myself  to  finite  N-person  extensive  form  games  of  perfect  recall 
(Kuhn  [13]).  At  the  beginning  of  the  game  F,  "nature" makes  a  (possibly 
degenerate) random move.4 IA'  denotes the jth  information set of the ith player, 
4Harsanyi [10] has  shown  that games having various sorts of  incomplete  information, such as 
incomplete knowledge of others' utility functions, can be handled by an ingenious use of the random 
move  at  the  beginning  of  the  game.  Hence  the  solution  concept  defined  here encompasses  such 
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and SV the set of choices at IF. Forj  #  k, IF is apredecessor of Iik  if there exist a 
terminal node y  and a node x in I,  such that the path from x  to y  goes through 
iik;  Ijik is a successor of I'M.  A pure strategy  f for player i is a function associating 
with each information set IN of i one of the choices in SY; denote this choice by 
f(i, j). 
DEFINITION  8:  If f  and g are pure strategies for i, g is an U-replacement  for f  if 
for all 1  :=] j  such that jIl  is not a successor  to I'Y, g(i, 1) = f(i,  1). 
This says that f  and g agree everywhere except on IY and its successors. 
With each profile of pure strategies is associated a utility for each player; the 
domain of the utility functions U' is extended to fl=  1Mr by an expected utility 
calculation,  where Mr  is  the  mixed  strategy simplex  of  player r.  Consider a 
particular information set IF' and a profile m =  (m 1,  ..  .  mN  )  of (mixed) strate- 
gies. If  for each  terminal node y  reached with positive probability when m is 
played, and each x  E  I U,  x does not lie on the path from the origin toy,  then IN 
is not reached by m. If the condition is violated, I  is reached by m. 
Consider the  game  I1  having  perfect  information  (all  information  sets  are 
singletons) and  no  randomness. (When representing games where the random 
move is restricted to one choice, I simply omit the random player's information 
set.)  Although  the  outcome  yielding  (0, 0)  is  absurd,  it  is  among  the  Nash 
equilibrium outcomes of F1. If 1 specifies the choice a1 (with probability 1) and 2 
chooses ,B2,  neither has an incentive to deviate. But everyone must agree that if 1 
were to play a2  2 would, upon being reached, respond by playing /B1.  Knowing 
this,  1 should play  a2.  The  imperfect behavior arises because  in  the  dubious 
equilibrium, 2's information set is not reached with positive probability. Conse- 
quently 2 can specify any choice with impunity. 
Subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten [20, 21]) deals nicely with examples of this 
variety. A Nash equilibrium is subgame  perfect if the strategies it induces on any 
proper subgame  of  F  (see  Selten  [21]) constitute  a  Nash  equilibrium of  that 
subgame. In  F1, 2's  choice  of  /B2  is not  Nash  on  the  subgame starting at  2's 
information set. 
Unfortunately  there are often  too  few  proper subgames  to  allow  subgame 
perfection to enforce intuitively reasonable behavior in a game. This prompted 
Selten [21] to introduce a further notion, perfect equilibrium,  or trembling hand 
(0,  0) 
I~~~ 
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perfect equilibrium. The set of perfect equilibria is a subset of the set of subgame 
perfect equilibria. As  was noted  in  Section 3, the indiscriminate nature of  the 
"trembles" allowed  causes  problems for  the  perfect  equilibrium concept.  The 
attempt  by  Myerson  [16] to  correct  this  by  limiting  the  class  of  admissible 
trembles was  only  partially successful;  proper equilibrium remains too  deeply 
rooted in the stochastic "small mistakes" framework to escape all the difficulties 
created by that approach. A major alternative has been suggested by Kreps and 
Wilson  [12]. Their  solution  concept,  sequential equilibrium, is  based  upon  an 
examination of rational beliefs rather than the possibilities for error. 
While  all  of  the  solution  concepts  mentioned  above  have  features that are 
extremely attractive, examples abound in which none of the equilibrium notions 
is  satisfactory  (one  well-known  example  is  presented  later  in  this  section). 
Equally important is the fact that they all admit Nash  profiles only; this paper 
attempts to  escape  that restriction. Let us  try to  apply  the  idea  of  consistent 
conjectures to examples such as P1. 
The possibility of collapsing series of choices into timeless contingent strategies 
must not obscure the fact that the phenomenon being modelled is some sequen- 
tial game, in which conjectures may be contradicted in the course of play. In F1, 
it is ludicrous to maintain that if 2 is called upon to move, having been reached, 
he  might choose  f2,  thinking that a1 was  played  by  1. By  the  time he  must 
commit himself to a course of action, 2 knows that it is a fact that 1 played a2. 
The observation that a conjecture must not be maintained in the face of evidence 
that refutes it is a central element of  the sequential equilibrium concept;  it is 
combined here with a further principle and the iterative techniques of previous 
sections to construct a new solution concept for extensive form games. 
Since a player's beliefs about others' strategies may be refuted as a play of the 
game progresses, he might need to formulate new conjectures as the old ones are 
disproven. Consequently I associate a conjecture' 
C  =  (Cy(l),  ...  ,  cu(N)) 
with each information set IF in P; cy"(k)  represents what an "agent"j for player i 
believes, once IF is reached, about what player k's mixed strategy is. A conjec- 
ture c Y(k) over  a  set  A k c  Mk  can  be  regarded as  an  element  of  Ak  (see 
Appendix A). 
I  have  noted  that an  agent  ij,  upon  being  reached,  should  not  entertain a 
conjecture that does  not  reach IF.  A  further restriction, not  invoked  in  other 
solution concepts, is appropriate: if the information set can be reached without 
violating  the  rationality  of  any  player,  then  the  agent's  conjecture  must  not 
attribute an irrational strategy to any player. In other words, he should seek a 
reasonable explanation for what he has observed. This principle is applied within 
an iterative procedure similar to that of Section 2, suitably elaborated to exploit 
the additional information in the extensive form. 
For  later reference, the iterative procedure is  defined  for sets H 1, . . .,  HN 
satisfying certain properties; our immediate interest is in the technique applied to 
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DEFINITION 9:  Let H = (H  ,...,  HN)  where Vi H'  is closed, nonempty, and 
has the pure strategy property. Define H'(0)  =  H',  i =  1, ..  .,  N. For any t >  1, 
define the sets H  (t),  . . .,  HN(t)  recursively as follows. For each pure strategy 
/,  E  H'(t  -  1), let J'(/,  SH,  t)  contain  all  those j  such  that I/'  can  be  reached 
by  some  profile  of  the  form  (mI,  . .  , mi-  , /,m''i+l,  mN),  where  mr' 
Hr(t-  1), r =  1, ..  .,  N.  (The eventual interpretation will be that at stage t of 
the logical deduction process, i knows that if he plays /,  no information set IP' 
will be reached unless j  E J (/,  H, t).) A  strategy a E H(t  -  1) giving positive 
weight  to  pure  strategies  ax, . .. a.  is  an  element  of  Hi(t)  if  there  exist 
conjectures cJ7,  z =  1, ...,  h, such that for all z, and allj  E J'(a,  H,t): 
(i) czj  (i) =  z; 
(ii)  CzJ(l)=cf(),  i; 
(iii)  for  r,s  E  Ji(oa,  H,t),  if Iir is a predecessor  of  IiS  and  cjr  reaches  Ii,  then 
is  ir. 
(iv) czj reaches IJ; 
(v)  czJ E IIN  Hr(t  -  1); and 
(vi) az is a best response to czJ  among all ij-replacements  for az in H'(t  -  1). 
For each i, define 
00 
R'(H)  =  (  Hi(t). 
t=1 
DEFINITION  10: R'(M)  is the set of rationalizable  strategies for player i, where 
M  =  (M  , ...,  MN)  is  the  vector  of  mixed  strategy  sets. 
The  iterative procedure is  interpreted as  follows.  At  each  stage,  additional 
restrictions are placed on conjectures and actions only at information sets that 
can be reached by profiles of strategies not previously eliminated. In a particular 
play of the game, player i uses some pure strategy az which is a realization of the 
mixed strategy a. Condition (i) says that i's "conjecture" about his own strategy 
is correct. The next requirement stipulates that conjectures about others' strate- 
gies  do  not  depend  upon  which  of  the  a,  . . .,  ah  player  i  ends  up  using. 
According to (iii), a conjecture should not be discarded unless it is contradicted 
(by  arrival at  an  information  set  unreachable by  the  conjecture in  question). 
Condition (iv) ensures that a conjecture at Ii' explains how that information set 
could  have  been  reached. The  principle that  the  explanation  should  be  "rea- 
sonable" is embodied in (v), which restricts conjectures to strategies that have not 
been eliminated at a previous stage. Finally, the strategy chosen by i should at all 
times be an optimal response to the conjectures he holds. The most convenient 
way to express this condition is to consider  j-replacements for ao; these represent 
the options  still open  to  i  at I'J. Among  these, ao must constitute  an  optimal 
contingent plan, given that beliefs about others' mixed strategies are described 
by cz' 
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PROPOSITION  4:  Under the assumptions  of Definition 9, for all i and t, Hi(t)  is 
nonempty,  closed, and has the pure strategy  property.  Furthermore  3k  such that Vi, 
H'(t)  =  H'(k),  Vt >  k. 
PROOF:  The  sets  H'(t),  i =  1, . . . , N,  inherit  the  pure  strategy  property, 
nonemptiness, and closedness from the original sets H'. This is easy to see in the 
case of the pure strategy property, because if the pure strategies of which a mixed 
strategy a  is  comprised  can  collectively  satisfy  (i)  to  (vi),  each  of  the  pure 
strategies satisfies the  conditions  individually. To  show  nonemptiness,  assume 
H1(t  -  1), . . . , HN(t  -  1) are nonempty  and  closed,  and  choose  any  conjecture 
c =  (c(1),  . ..  , c(N))  such  that  c(r)  E  Hr(t  -  1)  gives  positive  weight  to  every 
pure strategy in Hr(t  -  1). Since  U'  is continuous  and H'(t  -  1) is nonempty 
and compact, there exists an a that is a best response in H'(t  -  1) to 3. a may be 
chosen to be a pure strategy, because H1(t -  1) has the pure strategy property. 
For every j  J1(a, H, t), define 
c=  (C(1),  .  .  ,  C(i  -  1),a,c(i  +  1),  ..  .,  c(N)). 
a and c1  satisfy (i) to (vi). (i) holds by definition. (ii) is trivially satisfied because 
there is only  one pure strategy involved. (iii) is equally clear since c  is not  a 
function of j  as defined. In all components except i, c1 gives positive weight to all 
pure strategies not  eliminated in previous rounds; hence  c1  reaches Ii  for all 
E  JT(a, H, t), and (iv) is satisfied. (v) holds by the definition of 3. Since a  is a 
best response to c1 in H1(t -  1), a is certainly a best response to cp in the set of 
all  q-replacements for  a  in  H'(t  -  1); therefore a E H'(t).  To  establish  that 
Hi(t)  is closed, consider a sequence,81,  82  .2..  in H'(t)  converging to a strategy 
,8. H'(t  -  1) is closed by hypothesis, so ,  E H'(t  -  1). For some integer V, it 
must be the case that for all W >  V, Pw gives positive weight to (at least) all the 
pure strategies given positive weight by P3.  But there exists a set of conjectures c,'i 
(where z  indexes  the pure strategies comprising liv)  such  that 8v  and  the  cZ' 
satisfy (i) to (vi). Then /8 and the cz' (omitting any conjecture corresponding to 
pure strategies not given positive weight by /8)  satisfy (i) to (vi). Thus /B E H'(t), 
and the set is closed. 
H'(t  +  1) can  differ from H'(t)  only  if  for  some j,  Hi(t)  #  HJ(t -  1). But 
since Hi(t)  and Hi(t  -  1) both satisfy the pure strategy property, their convex 
hulls differ only if some pure strategy in Hi(t  -  1) is absent from H'(t).  Thus, 
the  iterative  procedure  "stops" in  k  steps  for  some  finite  k,  because  pure 
strategies are in finite supply. 
COROLLARY:  The rationalizable  sets R '(M),  . . . , R N(M)  are nonempty,  closed, 
and satisfy the pure strategy  property. Thus a rationalizable  profile of pure strategies 
always exists. 
PROOF: Set H'  =  M'  V  i in Proposition 10. 1044  DAVID  G. PEARCE 
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To  get  some  feeling  for  how  this  solution  concept  operates,  consider  two 
examples, starting with the familiar P1. In that game, 1 is unable to eliminate any 
strategy in  the first round. Since strategies of  1 that reach 2's information set 
must give positive weight to a2, 2 must remove all strategies that are not best 
responses to some such strategy. This eliminates all strategies of 2 except,f3,  so in 
the next round,  1 retains the only strategy that is a best response to ,B1,  name- 
ly  a2. 
A more challenging test for the theory is an example that Kreps and Wilson 
[12] attribute to E. Kohlberg. (The example is robust: small perturbations in the 
payoffs will not alter any of the statements made below.) In the game F2, player 
2 has only one information set, which is indicated in the game tree by enclosing 
the two nodes in that information set by an oblong figure. Notice  that a I strongly 
dominates  a3;  the  latter will  never  be  played  with  positive  probability by  a 
rational player. If reached, 2 should conclude  that a2  was played and respond 
optimally by playing,f1.  Knowing that this would be 2's response, 1 should play 
a2.  Despite this simple argument, another Nash equilibrium (which can actually 
be shown to be a trembling hand perfect, proper, and sequential equilibrium) has 
1 playing a1 with certainty and 2 playing /2.  This is not rationalizable. In the first 
"round," all  strategies giving  a3  positive  weight  are  removed.  In  the  second 
round, since these strategies are absent from M 1(I), 2 eliminates every strategy 
except  f,3, because  elements  of  M1(l)  reaching 2's  information  set  are  those 
giving  some  positive  weight  to  a2.  In  the  third round,  1 has  a  unique  best 
response a2 to the single element fl,  in M2(2). The only rationalizable profile of 
P2 is what Kreps and Wilson agree is the only reasonable profile. Their general 
remarks on what beliefs should be admissible are interesting: 
"Some sequential equilibria are supported by beliefs that the analyst can reject because 
they are supported by beliefs that are implausible. We will not propose any formal criteria 
for 'plausible beliefs' here. In certain cases, such as Myerson's concept of properness, some 
formalization is possible.  In other cases, it  is not  clear that any  formal criteria can  be 
devised-it  may be that arguments must be tailored to the particular game" (Kreps and 
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Rationalizability formalizes the notion  that beliefs may be implausible at an 
information set because (i) the set could not have been reached had those beliefs 
been true, or (ii) they are inconsistent with the results of logical deductions based 
on what players know about one another and the rules of the game. If rational- 
izability  fails  to  narrow down  the  possible  outcomes  significantly  in  a  given 
game, one  might then consider applying criteria of a more ad hoc  description, 
and perhaps make predictions on  a game-by-game basis as Kreps and Wilson 
suggest. 
5.  CAUTIOUS  RATIONALIZABILITY IN THE EXTENSIVE FORM 
It is straightforward to verify that in a perfectly simultaneous nonstochastic 
game,  the  rationalizable sets conform  to  the  normal form  definition  given  in 
Section  2,  applied  to  the  normal  form of  the  game  in  question.  But in  such 
games,  rationalizable behavior is  not  always  "cautious": the  solution  concept 
does not prevent imperfection of the second type. A  simple demonstration that 
this applies equally to the extensive form is given by F3, whose normal form is 
G2,  Myerson's  example.  If  both  players  make  prudent  choices,  (a,;  f,B) will 
result. But (a2;  82)  is also rationalizable. Such behavior can be avoided by the 
same technique as that employed in Section 3. A  natural generalization of  the 
normal form analysis is accomplished here as briefly as possible. 
DEFINITION  11: Given  the  sets  R '(M),  . ..  , R N(M)  of  (extensive  form) 
rationalizable strategies, for each i define 
C1(1) =  {oa  E R'(M):  a is a cautious response in R1(M) 
to (R 1(M),  ...  ,  RN(M))}. 
For t >  1, define C'(t)  recursively for each i by 
C'(t)  =  {a E R'(C(t  -  1)):  a is a cautious  response  in R'(C(t  -  1)) 
to (R l(C(t  -1)),  ... .,  RN(C(t  -1)))), 
al~~~~  (1 , 1 ) 
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where C(t  -  1)=  (C(t  -  1), .  .  .,  CN(t  -  1)), and the functions R' are those of 
Definition  10, Section 2. For each i, 
00 
Q'n=  fC'(t) 
t=1 
is  the  set  of  cautiously rationalizable strategies  for  player  i.  A  profile  (a 1, 
...  ,a  N)  is cautiously  rationalizable  if a'  E  Q' Vi. 
At each "round," strategies that are not best responses are discarded first, and 
then those that are not cautious responses are removed. 
PROPOSITION 5:  For some integer k, 
C'(t)=  C'(k)  Vt>k,  Vi. 
Moreover,  the set Q' of cautiously rationalizable  strategies is nonempty,  closed, and 
satisfies the pure strategy  property V  i. 
The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 4, and is 
omitted. 
The solution concept has the attractive feature that in the play of a game, no 
one's  conjectures are  ever  contradicted.  Since  each  person's  conjecture  gives 
positive weight to every cautiously rationalizable strategy of every other player, 
nothing that is believed by any player to have zero probability ever occurs, so 
long as others choose cautiously. 
It might appear at first glance that in a game such as J4  in which 1 should be 
indifferent between  a1 and  a2  (according to  subgame perfection  or backward 
induction), cautious rationalizability forces  1 to choose a,,  by eliminating a2  in 
the first round, before  2 has been removed. In fact this does not happen. Recall 
that before the cautious response criterion comes into play, the rationalizable sets 
are  calculated.  For  2,  this  eliminates  all  strategies  except  /,8;  in  "cautious 
response" to this, 1 plays either a, or a2. 
(5,  5) 
a, 
1  n 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
In response to the opening question: "What constitutes rational behavior in a 
noncooperative strategic situation?" an extremely conservative theory of strategic 
behavior, rationalizability, has  been  developed.  Without  attempting to  predict 
behavior uniquely in all games, the solution concept rules out strategic choices on 
the  basis  of  rather fundamental  principles such  as  maximization  of  expected 
utility, and the common knowledge assumption. Rationalizability is well suited to 
dealing  with  implausible  behavior  at  "unreached" information  sets,  but  an 
additional assumption that players are in some sense cautious is needed to deal 
with a second kind of imperfection. Incorporation of this assumption results in a 
more restrictive solution concept, cautious rationalizability. 
In conclusion, I wish to emphasize two points. First, as a necessary condition 
for a strategy profile to be reconcilable with the rationality of  the players, the 
appropriate criterion is rationalizability rather than Nash equilibrium. Secondly, 
when one analyzes an economic or abstract game, every attempt should be made 
to exploit the informational structure of the extensive form, whether the objective 
is to make a specific prediction, or simply to place bounds upon what outcomes 
could possibly arise. 
Princeton University 
Manuscript  received  June, 1982; final revision  received  June, 1983. 
APPENDIX  A 
A conjecture over a set A in Euclidean space is a probability measure y  defined on the Borel sets 
of A.  A  trivial corollary of  Lemma  1 below is that the mean of A  with respect to ,t lies in A,  the 
convex hull of A.  Lemma 2 states that the expected utility associated with the conjecture ,t can be 
calculated using the mixed strategy y  =  fA  XM (dx). 
LEMMA  1: Suppose that A is a convex subset of Euclidean space, and pt(A) =  1. 
y-f<  xM(dx) E A. 
PROOF: If /t is a point mass, the result is immediate. If not, find a minimal affine subspace S such 
that p.(A n  s) =  1. Without loss of generality assume 0 E S.  If y E S\A,  3p E S, p s- 0 such that 
sup p * (A n  S)  <  p  y. The setS  =  {x E S: p.  x =  sup p  (A n  S)}  has lower dimension than S, 
and hence M(A n s') <  1. Thus fASUP P  (A n S)M  (dx)  >  JAP  xpt  (dx). 
Now 
sup p  (A n s) = f  (sup p  (A n S))  (dx) 
>JP  xM  (dx) 
=P  .fA  x(dx) 
=  p  y,  a contradiction. 1048  DAVID  G. PEARCE 
LEMMA 2:  Let  M  be  the  mixed  strategy  simplex  associated  with  the pure  strategy  set  S= 
{ a.  aj,}  and let U:  M  R.  Lety-fMxpu(dx),  where I(M)=  1. Then 
fm 
w  w 
xiUos  u(dx)  =  i,  y  U(axi). 
PROOF: 
xi  U(a1)  )i  (dx)  =  f  1  xi U(ai)pt (dx) 
w 
=  U(aj)f  xi  t(dx) 
w 
=  E  y1U(a). 
APPENDIX  B 
This  appendix  presents two  lemmas  relating the  properties "best response" and  "cautious re- 
sponse," to strong and weak dominance,  respectively. Related results have been established in the 
literature5 (see, for example, Ferguson [7, Theorem  1, p. 86]) but the proofs are included here for 
completeness.  Dilip  Abreu  suggested  the  arguments  used  below.  Note  that  the  results  are  not 
restricted to zero-sum games, but cannot be generalized to N-person games, where the propositions 
are false. However if one permits opponents to correlate their random strategies, the proofs are easily 
extended to the N-person case. 
LEMMA  3:  Let G-(S  1,  S2; U1, U2) be a finite noncooperative  game, with associated mixed strategy 
sets M 1  and M2.  a*  E  M 1 is strongly dominated  if and only if Om E  M 2 such that a is a best response  to 
m. 
PROOF: If some /B  E  M'  strongly dominates a, then Vy E  M2, U'(/,  _y)  >  U'(a,  y), so a is never 
a best response. To establish the converse, suppose a  is not a best response to any element of M 2. 
Then there exists a function b:  M2 -  M I with U'(b(m),  m) >  U '(a, m) Vm. Consider the zero-sum 
game G=(S  1,  S2; U1, U2) where U'(x, y) =  U'(x,  y)-  U'(a, y) and U2(x, y) =-U'(x,  y). Let 
(x*, y*)  be a Nash equilibrium of G. For any m E  M2, 
UI(x*,  m) >  UI(x*,  y*) 
*  UI(b(y*),  y*) 
>  UI(a,y*) 
=0. 
But 
Ul(x*,m)  > 0 
Vm=  UI(x*,  m) >  U'(a,  m)  Vm 
a is strongly dominated by x*.  Q.E.D. 
5After the page proofs of this paper were prepared, I learned from Eric van Damme that Lemmas 
3 and 4 are extremely closely related to Lemma 3.2.1 and Theorem 3.2.2 in van Damme [4] and to 
much earlier work of Gale and Sherman [9]. RATIONALIZABLE  STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR  1049 
Because the derivation of cautiously rationalizable strategies involves alternation of the operations 
R and C (see Section 3), this criterion differs from "iterative weak dominance" techniques, as G4 of 
Section 3 illustrates. Lemma 4 shows, however, that there is a close connection  between "caution" 
and weak dominance. 
LEMMA  4:  Let G = (S 1,  S2; U1, U2) be a finite noncooperative  game, with associated mixed strateg 
sets M 1 and M2. a e  M 1 is weakly dominated  if and only if a is not a cautious response  to (M 1,  M). 
PROOF: Suppose  that  a  is  weakly  dominated  by  some  y E M1.  Then  for  any  x  E  M2  giving 
strictly positive weight to every pure strategy in M2, U'(a,  x) <  U1(y, x),  so by definition a  is not a 
cautious response to (M l, M2). 
To establish the converse, suppose that a is not a cautious response. Define 
A =  { a' E  M 1 : U l(a,  x) =  U'(a,  x) Vx  E  M2}. 
Let k be the number of pure strategies in M2,  and T be the open interval (0, 1/k).  Define 
G  =  { x  e  M2:  xi >  C, i =  1, . . . , k)} 
B,=  {/  EM':  U'(f8, x) >  U'(a, x) Vx E 8}, 
W,  ={/E  M':  U'(/,  x) >  U '(a, x)  Vx  e  }. 
a  is not a cautious response to (Ml, M2), so for each cE  T, a  is not a best response to any x E  S 
and  a  repetition  of  the  argument  of  Lemma  3  (regarding 8f  as  the  opponent's  strategy space) 
establishes that B,  is nonempty.  Since  W, is closed and nonempty, for each  e  E  T we can choose 
/3, E M 1 that is a best response in W, to (1/k,  . . .,  1/k)  E 8.  Notice  that /3, yields  1 strictly higher 
utility against (1  /k,  . . .1,  /k)  than a, since B  C5  W,  Choose a sequence of Ei's  in T converging to 0, 
such that { f,8,  converges; let ,B* be the limit of  the sequence { ,4.  We will show that /B* weakly 
dominates a. 
Continuity of  U1 guarantees that /B*  is at least as good for l as a against all x E M2. It remains 
only to show that ,/*  E  A. If 3a'  E A with a' = ,B*, then for all sufficiently small y  /34 gives positive 
weight to every pure strategy given positive weight by a'. Then A > 0 can be chosen sufficiently small 
so that all components of 
=  (,8B  -AXa') 
are nonnegative. For any x E 
ul  ( A,,x) 
-  U'(,,,  x)  AAU'(t,8,x)  -  U'(a,  x)  >  0 
because /  E  W  . Moreover the inequality is strict when x = (1/k,  .  l/k).  Thus /  is in W4 and 
yields 1 higher utility than /,  against (1/k,  . . .,  l/k),  a contradiction.  Q.E.D. 
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